The tragedy of October 3, 2013, off the coast of Lampedusa (Italy), in which 306 men, women and children died while fleeing countries devastated by war or dictatorships (Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia, among others) in search of a better life, reminds us of the cruel fate that has confronted tens of thousands of migrants each year -for the past two decades -in the Mediterranean region. 
European migratory policy in the countries neighboring the EU and beyond, was put into place; since 2005, Frontex (the European Agency for the management of operational cooperation at the external borders of the member states of the European Union) uses radar, thermal imaging cameras, ships, helicopters, planes and will soon use drones, too, from the Strait of Gibraltar to Cyprus via the Greek islands in the Aegean Sea. From 2011, Eurosur, a coordinated surveillance system, relies on innovative technology to militarize the external borders of the EU and thus limit the number of 'illegal' immigrants from entering. These different provisions produce complex assemblages (Allen & Cochrane, 2010) and are consequently marked by a constant evolution that gives the impression of 'migratory borders' that are constantly moving and reconstructing themselves.
The aim of this article is to describe and analyze these border schemes in accordance with the 140 questions concerning the people who die in the process of migration, and to see how these border controls are responsible -either directly or indirectly -for the deaths of migrants at the borders and how they influence the displacement of these tragedies. This article will also present the advantages of a quantitative approach, which is made possible by the clustering of these situations in the Mediterranean Sea. This approach allows the creation of brand-new cartographic representations of what can call be referred to as a 'border hotspot' in order to give a new perception of this border, not to be seen as a limit between two territories but rather as a space between these two zones: a completely separate space where personal stories and tragedies occur. The article is original in that it bases its analysis on the social, political and spatial interaction surrounding the maritime area over which the borders of the Mediterranean Sea stretch out, giving it an unprecedented complexity.
1. The fluctuating and restrictive aspects of European border regimes
The expansion of border zones under the impetus of international agreements
With the signing of multiple international agreements between the EU's member states and its neighboring countries, which seek to return or drive back 'illegal' immigrants, the relocation of border controls has been strengthened considerably. These agreements can be bilateral (such as Spain-Morocco, Italy-Libya) or include the entire European community. Since 2002, the Justice and Home Affairs Council (JHA) has made it one its priorities to establish readmission agreements with those countries that share a border with the EU and also with those from where there are a large number of migrants (Morocco, Turkey) into the union. There is also the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), where migration and border controls are two important topics. More 'technical' agreements, like those that the European agency Frontex has signed with countries such as Turkey or that they are trying to negotiate with countries such as Jordan, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, Mauritania and Senegal, underline the willingness of the EU to establish a buffer zone over the entire southern part of the Mediterranean region. Moreover, in its annual report from 2012, Frontex 141 emphasized that while the European Commission is primarily interested in creating a dialogue on migration, mobility and security with these countries, the agency 'was active in developing contacts with the competent authorities of these countries and looking to initiate formal negotiations to conclude working arrangements where appropriate' v . Through these different issues relating to European migratory controls operating in the countries of origin and to the transit of migrants, the mechanisms aimed at fighting 'illegal immigration' are based on a 'plurality of actors in outposts who relate to a trend of leverage and invisibility of borders at the mercy of the deployment of controls' (Blanchard, Clochard, & Rodier, 2010, p. 5) . For example, Moroccan and Spanish police forces closely collaborate on surveillance in the Strait of Gibraltar, and return migrants to Morocco who have reached the sovereign territories of Ceuta and Melilla. Between May and September 2012, hundreds of migrants who had invaded these populated Spanish exclaves situated in close proximity to the Moroccan coastline, were deported to Morocco. On February 6, 2014, the Guardia Civil and the Moroccan police fended off nearly 300 people of sub-Saharan origin who were trying to reach the sovereign territory of Ceuta. 'Some of these migrants jumped into the sea in order to try and reach the beach at Tarajal. At least 15 people drowned (…) others were declared missing' Following this event, the assistant director of Frontex said the agency would not take responsibility for the risks faced by those people who are sent back, and it was not able confirm that their right to asylum and human rights were being respected in Libya' , who said that after five days of crossing the waters and they had nearly reached the coast of Malta, they were retrieved by some boats who handed 143 them over to the Libyan coastguard, which subsequently detained them in this camp. These practices violate the principle of non-refoulement set out by the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, which prohibits the deportation of foreigners to a country where they risk being subjected to torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment xii . The regulation on maritime surveillance, adopted in the spring of 2014, is in the process of legitimizing these practices as the text makes reference to sending back migrants stopped in international waters.
… to the treatment of 'illegal passengers' aboard ships
In Europe, border crossings by foreigners without valid documents is being criminalized more and more, which means immigration is often associated with a criminal offense There are also the cases of other ships, like those from Frontex or the Spanish navy under the banner of NATO: On July 11, 2011, the Almirante Juan de Borbón rescued over 100 'boat people' of sub-Saharan origin, as well as some Tunisians and Libyans; however, they were not granted permission to disembark in Malta or Italy xix . Consequently, the people had to stay aboard for six days, until a Tunisian military vessel took responsibility for them and they could disembark in Tunisia.
Hence, irrespective of the status of the ship that rescues these boat people, they often find themselves confined to the ship before being disembarked in neighboring countries such as Libya or Tunisia. Therefore after having assisted these people who were shipwrecked, the rescue boat plays a role in the detention and ultimately the violation of the principle of non-refoulement of asylum seekers. Therefore, is the ultimate 'mobile border' not bound by the measures put into place for the ships of the merchant navy?
Waiting areas (transit zones) at ports
In reference to waiting areas (transit zones) at European ports, we can observe the diversity of the layouts of border areas that occur over time so that border controls can be more effective and are 145 not challenged by the justice system when it has to intervene.
The legislation relating to the upkeep of waiting areas (transit zones) in France has continued to evolve over time. Today, there is a measure that is movable, namely a sort of resiliency of borders.
Since its creation, in 1992, the waiting area (transit zone) has been limited to areas of disembarkation and areas where controls were operated and may have included buildings that provided 'hotel type services'. The courts where the migrants were taken in order to extend their stay were not considered to be part of this waiting area (transit zone). There was a regular debate between the legislator, civil servants, judges and NGOs to establish whether these places were part or not of waiting areas (transit zones). In 2003, this controversy was settled by a law that explained that thenceforth, these waiting areas (transit zones) would 'stretch, without there needing to be a particular decision, to the places in which the migrant must go either in the case of an ongoing legal process, either in the case of medical needs.' The provisions introduced in 2011 strengthened this procedure and aimed to answer similar situations to the one that happened off the coast of Corsica in January 2010, when 123 Kurds were disembarked outside official border points. These areas can now be created 'when it is obvious that a group of at least 10 migrants arrive in France outside a normal border crossing.' As a result, these areas can now be created anywhere on the territory.
These migrants who have just arrived in a specific territory can be in 'the same place or in a group of distinct places within a 10-kilometer radius.' The existence of these waiting areas (transit zones) is only temporary, as their maximum duration cannot exceed 26 days. Such a manipulation of the law for the purposes of migratory controls falls under the 'delinearization' process of state limits that started during the 1990s. It is important to understand the dramatic consequences of the governance of the external limits of the EU, which is supported by more and more powerful technology. Even if it is difficult to understand the totality of this tragedy, cartography can be useful here.
A cartographic overview of these tragedies
The map showing the number of migrants that have died at Europe's borders was published in a large number of books, both scientific and press articles, and was also used in Web documentaries and films. It is used to remind us that what happens at the EU borders is not merely fatalities but the product of political intentions, namely to prevent men, women and children from accessing the territory of the European Union (EU). Even if this map has gained notoriety among campaigns and institutional networks, universities and even schools, it has not prompted deep change in European 147 migratory policy. It can also be used by some writers in a way that is contrary to its initial conception. How many times have we heard that it is important to reflect on new means of surveillance in order to avoid such tragedies? Consequently, the strengthening of border controls continues. Unfortunately, this has done little to reduce the number of tragedies in the Mediterranean Sea. We must also be mindful that the deadly borders of the European Union (EU) go much farther than only its external borders. The collaborations put into place between the EU, its member states and neighboring countries -Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania and Senegalpush the police forces in these countries to commit criminal offences (see below) that often go unpunished.
So how can we project this European border via a map? As we have seen already, this cannot be summed up merely by tracing a simple line (like the Schengen Area, for example) that is supposedly protected by barriers and border guards. This migratory border, whose particularity is that it is for the most part maritime and materializes by measures that do not stop moving, cannot be represented by an official outline but rather via its practical aspect and the effects it produces. By a phenomenological approach, we will use different maps to show the tragic events that migratory controls lead to each year, namely the migrants (men, women and children) who have died at Europe's borders, and thus try to produce a new political and subjective outlook of Europe's migratory border.
Maps used in the fight against deadly policies -counting the number of deaths during migration
There is no official data concerning the number of migrants who have died at the borders of the European Union. However, via the press and other media, we know that among the thousands of people seeking asylum in Europe, who flee countries that are in crisis or because of war, some never reach their destination. According to the European network UNITED for Intercultural Action, which has collected data from the press since 1993, the number of refugees, asylum seekers or migrants that have died trying to reach the EU borders has peaked at nearly 18,000 people. This database, which also contains the number of deaths following deportation, clearly shows a large progressive increase that peaked at nearly 2,000 deaths in 2011. At first sight, the different critical analyses of European migratory policy show that this evolution corresponds with a real increase that, however, is not devoid of statistical bias linked to growing attention by the media toward this issue. In fact, better media coverage has indisputably created a mediatized magnifying or probe effect that complicates the construction of relatively objective measures. By contrast, there are certainly situations that have not been able to be identified, such as those of the numerous migrants who died of dehydration in the Sahara. It is for this reason we are working here not on the evolution of this phenomenon but rather on the representation of the number of deaths since 1993. These figures represent only a small drop in the ocean compared with the bloodbath that should be at the heart of all policy.
Developed collectively from information that is difficult to locate with precision (many events took place at sea), the 'géocodage' xx of the information, which is a prerequisite for the creation of these maps, was not an easy task. The events collected by the press are often located either with precision or very approximately (for example, 'in the desert', or 'between the Libyan coastline and Italy'), and we were therefore obligated to take certain precautions when processing this information.
Nonetheless, the cartographic depiction of the events at Europe's borders put forward in this article was designed to produce an overview of these events. The uncertainty surrounding localization will largely be compensated by a higher level of aggregation. breaking down these events on the maps according to the cause of death, different circles, both large or small, distinguish between those people who drowned, committed suicide, suffocated, starved or froze to death, died in fires, or were poisoned. Ultimately, the map gives us a radical and dissenting image of European migratory policy, which is deemed to be responsible for this situation.
Other representations of this database have also been made. Some of the maps produced for Le Monde diplomatique xxii or in the framework of the European project ESPON Cartographic Language xxiii (Lambert, Ysebaert, & Zanin, 2013) pay particular attention to the subjective aspect of cartographic representation by portraying the map not from a bird's eye view but rather from a migrant's point of view. By orientating the projection of the map, which allows it to be shown at an angle so that gives the impression of observing Europe from Africa, the representation, thus devised, puts forward as many vast red circles as the insurmountable barriers erected by the European Union against migrants. However, even with these two examples, it remains a conventional cartographic representation based on classical mapping techniques and proportional circles. Other mapping techniques remain unexplored.
-Toward the production of an approach combining cartography and the study of migratory policies?
When Paul Ariès first used the term 'degrowth' (décroissance), he referred to it as a 'mot obus', or 'bombshell word'. According to him, it is designed to question and to definitively enter into public debate this term that may be deemed shocking, but its sensational side forces each person to give their opinion. The term 'degrowth' (décroissance) is a sort of dissension, which was conceived in order 'to pulverize the dominant way of thinking ' (Aries, 2004) . Therefore, putting forward graphically and aesthetically an idea that is not neutral, the maps can also be 'obus' or bombshells; in fact, they are even designed for that. Reality is complex, plural and marked by contradictory interests; it cannot be mapped in its entirety. In order to carry its message, the map must make abstract but also summarize and caricature. By classing the information, enlarging some elements and keeping some quiet, as is done in the press, the geographical map is ultimately a discursive object that serves to construct a discussion. To create a map is to affirm a view, and it is this confrontation of different viewpoints that causes the debate. It is therefore necessary to put on the table the maps that can be considered an 'obus' in order to create a radical and dissenting cartographic overview of European migratory borders.
Using potential theory, a simple mathematical process allows us to calculate in any area the value of an absolute quantitative variable localized in its surroundings. By fixing the form and the range of these surroundings, we can produce a simplified and generalized image (Didelon, Grasland, & Richard, 2008) of this geographical phenomenon (Plumjeau et al., 2007) . By varying the range of this function (adjustment/flattening of the Gaussian integral), we obtain a representation that is more or less 'generalized', allowing us to visualize at a single glance the large spatial structures and -in the zones that are of particular interest to us -the most devastating zones in this fight against migrants.
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Moreover, the display of these maps in 3D allows the relevant gradients to be represented by gradients (slopes) that are more or less steep and cannot be understood on a map that is 'flat' (in 2D). The relief also helps us to understand the numbers represented, as the height allows us to see, at a single glance, the amplitude of the peaks, and consequently to compare them with each other. It is on this basis that we have built the following maps. By applying this to our database on the deaths at the EU borders, this process allows us to produce five levels of spreading the information that will be mapped on the following pages.
152 Figure 7 .1 Cartographic generalization (potential method)
Cartographic metaphors or an effigy of a scattered reality?
A map is interesting insofar as it has something to say and is 'eloquent.' With the following maps, we will seek to tell a story -a cartographic narrative. Using press images, we want to make the different aspects of European migratory policy a reality by using these 'cartographic metaphors' and imbuing them with our imagination. In the same way a poignant novel can teach us as much about the real world as a rigorous and well-argued essay, we use metaphorical forms in order to see the true aspects of European migratory policy. It is a question of subjective and radical representations of the borders, but which are no less accurate than more conventional representations. Therefore, three cartographic accounts, created from the same data as the maps already presented above, will be presented below. Even if the first Schengen convention dates to 1985, the Schengen Area was progressively established during the mid-1990s and institutionalized at a European level by the Treaty of Amsterdam on October 2, 1997. It currently comprises 28 member states. According to the different European governments, the area of free movement inside the EU can only be tangible if Europe is able to effectively 'protect' its external borders. In order to ensure the longevity of this area of free movement and to reassure the member states, the Schengen Area was built on the drastic exclusion of foreigners who did not have the relevant authorization to enter or to live in this territory. European policy on visas -one of the first measures to be put into place -is characterized by a managerial and police-related approach to border control, which is based on the notion of 'migratory risk' (Migreurop, 2013) .
The map below was developed in the following way: The method of using potential theory is stabilized by using one scale of 500 kilometers in order to produce a standardized image represented by red contour lines (isolines). We calculated the ridge line and then drew it in three dimensions with the help of a GIS (geographic information system). This line showing the 154 maximum mortality separating Europe and Africa was then extruded in order to constitute a fence rising up as a migratory 'Iron Curtain'. This 'classic' symbolism that we also find in press drawings represents the defensive walls of a Europe that will protect itself at any cost against the hordes of migrants.
Even if this linear representation of the borders is in part a fantasy, it is no less true in certain areas.
In fact, the policy of 'securing borders' led by the EU also appears in the construction of walls like in the case of Ceuta, Melilla, and in the region of Evros in Greece. Moreover, in areas of the eastern borders, much more sophisticated protective measures than those used during the Cold War have been put in place, notably in Estonia and Bulgaria. However, these walls are ineffective in the medium and long terms, and they mainly play a discursive role. According to Wendy Brown, they can even be considered as one of the symptoms of a decline in state sovereignty in a world that wants to be 'more and more open ' (Brown, 2009 ).
Built where migratory tensions are at their highest, these walls are often disaster zones where human tragedy takes place. In 2005, a total of 17 migrants were shot dead in front of the walls that surround the Spanish exclaves of Ceuta (11 deaths) and Melilla (6 deaths). Hundreds of migrants were injured, and others were deported to the desert without any care or supplies. This wall of shame, which is also where Khady Demba dies in the story told by Marie Ndiaye in her book Three Strong Women, is represented on the map (NDiaye, 2009).
Figure 7.2 Europe, the 'fortress'
The migratory paths change, but the tragedies remain. An astute analysis of the database over time shows us that the strengthening of border controls set up by border control agencies and Frontex using nearly military-style measures does not contain these migratory flows but rather pushes them to use more dangerous routes. After Gibraltar and the Canary Islands, the most migrants now perish in the center of the Mediterranean. By fixing the cartographic spread at 500 kilometers, we can see the creation of a mound whose summit is situated in the center of the Mediterranean region. This mound, red like the blood spilled in this area, is produced by the number of deaths of migrants trying to reach Europe. This representation by 'geomorphology' symbolizes the idea of an accumulation of years and years of forgotten victims of a war that we never hear about. This representation of a migratory bloodbath has reached a level that we could never measure with complete accuracy.
This red mound obviously makes reference to the bloody episode of the First World War (The Bapaume mound) that is taken from the famous anti-war song written by Montéhus. By extension, the migratory red mound is also an appeal to stop this invisible war against migrants.
Figure 7.4 The migratory red mound

Conclusion
In the framework of political and operational partnerships that the EU has established with its neighbors, it happens more and more that the union exports these border controls whose locations are constantly modified at the mercy of its needs. This externalization that falls within the external territories of the EU is equally consolidated by the presence of Frontex or the Eurosur system.
There is also the fact that the European authorities are still not respecting the law of the sea and the decisions taken by the highest jurisdictions. These many points are well and truly the cause of the installation of these arbitrary lines and tragic situations. Thus, for more than the past 20 years, the Mediterranean Sea, such a beautiful natural object, has become lethal because of denied visas or the
